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Abstract: The interpreter-mediated Premier-Meets-the-Press Conferences are an institutional(ized) discursive event in China, permitting the Chinese premier to answer a range of potentially challenging and face-threatening questions from journalists. Arguably, this dynamic and interactive setting can be profitably conceptualized using Bakhtin’s notion of dialogized heteroglossia. As additional subjective actors in the triadic communication process, the government-affiliated interpreters are caught up in an ideological tug-of-war between the government and (foreign) journalists. That is, there is often a centripetal force pulling toward Beijing’s official positions and stances (the central, unitary and authoritative) and simultaneously a centrifugal force exerted by (foreign) journalists who pose sensitive and adversarial questions (toward the heteroglossic and peripheral away from the center). Manual CDA on 20 years’ corpus data illustrates the interpreters’ tendency to align with the government’s official positions, soften the journalists’ questions and (re)construct a more desirable image for Beijing.
Keywords: interpreter-mediated political press conferences; Bakhtin; dialogized heteroglossia; interpreter agency; critical discourse analysis (CDA)
Introduction
Gradually routinized as a communicative practice in post-1978 China, the interpreter-mediated Premier-Meets-the-Press political conferences are an institutional(ized) discursive event in mainland China held annually during China’s “two sessions” period (the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference) in Beijing. At a time when China increasingly opens itself up and pursues proactive international diplomacy since the reform and opening-up in 1978, the press conferences featuring the Chinese premier, who ranks second in the Chinese government, provide a rare and vital avenue for China’s top leadership to communicate with the outside world and to engage with an international audience on various topical issues.
To date, academic attention has focused on various aspects of (political) press conferences, including important political actors, such as Chinese and US president’s press conferences (Bhatia 2006), follow-up questions (Eriksson 2011), speaker positioning (Schäffner 2015) in press conferences, journalistic deference and adversarialness (Clayman and Heritage 2002), adversarial questioning and answering strategies (Sun 2010), politicians’ level of aggressiveness in answering questions (Wu and Zhao 2016), varying levels of adversarialness in Chinese and foreign journalists’ questions (Du and Rendle-Short 2016), the structural evolution and institutionalization of China’s press conferences (Yi 2016a) as well as information control and political impression management (Yi 2016b). However, relatively limited attention has been paid to the vital role of interpreting and interpreters in the communication process. Of the limited number of studies that do explore interpreting and interpreters at (political) press conferences and beyond, attention has mostly focused on questioning and answering strategies in interpreter-mediated football press conferences (Sandrelli 2018), issues relating to interpreting norms (Wang 2012), various individual grammatical categories and linguistic features/phenomena such as modality (Li and Hu 2013; Fu 2016), hedging devices (Pan and Zheng 2017), and the attributive modifying structures (Wang and Zou 2018) as well as the gender differences between male and female interpreters (Hu and Meng 2018).
However, despite the apparently discursive and ideological nature of (political) press conferences, interpreters’ agency and mediation have rarely been investigated critically from the vantage point of power and ideology. Such a scenario is in line with the general observation that academic research “on ideology and interpreting is still in its infancy” (Martin 2016: 239). This observation seems particularly the case in Chinese premier’s press conferences, despite the fact that the communicative event constitutes a major locus of ideology and site of discourse in projecting China’s national image and articulating Beijing’s official policies, positions and achievements to an international audience. Of the handful of critical discourse studies that have indeed engaged with power and ideology, Wang and Feng’s (2018) corpus-based study explores the interpreters’ treatment of 问题 (wenti) as a potentially attitude-laden lexical item susceptible to ideological manipulation and indicative of interpreters’ stance-taking. In addition, Gu’s (2018a) qualitative CDA study compares the official metadiscourse prescribing government interpreters’ expected roles with their actual level of agency in practice, and Gu’s (2018b) corpus-based CDA study looks into the interpreters’ vital role in image (re)construction and further political legitimization through mediating Beijing’s discourse on its past actions and achievements.
Notably, all the studies mentioned above have focused on the premier’s answers in Chinese and their corresponding English interpretations, which represent the government’s one-way communication with the audiences and constitute the bulk of the premier’s press conference data. In comparison, the section concerning the journalists’ questions and the interpreters’ on-site interpretations has received little scholarly attention so far. To the best of my knowledge, the only such study is Gu’s (forthcoming) article looking into the interpreters’ image (re)construction in rendering the journalists’ questions. Although questions at the discursive event are pre-vetted or “preselected” backstage (Yi 2016: 5474) and domestic journalists from mainland China tend to pose relatively easy softball questions (Gu 2018b), it is worth noting that foreign journalists habitually ask sensitive, challenging and potentially face-threatening questions (Du and Rendle-Short 2016) to tease out information from the Chinese government.
Compared with the premier’s answers, the specific section involving (foreign) journalists’ questions is considerably more dynamic, interactive and negotiated in nature, featuring a great degree of hybridity, the clash of different ideological beliefs and sometimes even competing “voices.” The essentially polyphonic or multivoiced (Bakhtin 1981) nature of this portion of the press conference makes it useful to explore how the interpreters position and negotiate their way when located between the Chinese government and (foreign) journalists. The interpreters’ potential ideological positioning is particularly interesting given the fact that (1) the interpreters’ intertextual renditions of the journalists’ questions are often the first step for the Chinese premier and the audiences to make sense of the questions asked and that (2) the interpreted discourse, once broadcast on TV, often gets further (re)contextualized and mediat(iz)ed on various other platforms (e.g., other TV channels, radios, newspapers, social media sites and scholarly works) as an official source of information (Gu 2018b). The interpretation of the journalists’ questions, as such, constitutes a vital starting point in the entire discursive communication and knowledge/international news production processes. 
Drawing on the Bakhtinian concept dialogized heteroglossia, this CDA study concerns a critical investigation of the interpreters’ agency and mediation, focusing particularly on their level of ideological positioning and institutional alignment in interpreting the journalists’ questions. It is hoped that this interdisciplinary study will further advance scholarship in translation and interpreting studies, media and communication studies and the political sciences alike.
Towards theorizing political press conference as site of dialogized heteroglossia
Unlike written communication or monolingual verbal communication, the essentially dynamic, dialogic, and highly interactive nature of the interpreter-mediated press conferences calls for a conceptualization of this specific institutional(ized) discursive event. Of particular use here is Bakhtin’s (1981) concept of dialogized heteroglossia, which is originally developed to examine literary texts.​[1]​ Drawing inspiration from physics, dialogized heteroglossia refers to the constant struggle and conflict between the “official” centripetal force and the “non-official” centrifugal force (Clark and Holquist 1984: 210), which seem to co-exist in almost any language, discourse, and utterance. That is, while there is a unifying and centralizing centripetal force toward the official, unitary, and monoglossic, there is usually a decentralizing and anti-canonical centrifugal force which pulls away from the centripetal and gravitates toward the heteroglossic.
As such, the dynamic institutional setting of the premier’s press conferences can itself be conceptualized as a form of dialogized heteroglossia. On the one hand, there exists a centripetal and legitimizing force emanating from the Chinese government seeking to “fix meaning and univocalize the sign” and enforce a sort of “ideological closure or homophony” (Gardiner 1992: 90). That is, through this mediat(iz)ed event, the government wishes to articulate its official lines and stances and its desired version of truth to the outside world in an authoritative manner. This seems particularly significant considering that China is increasingly seeking to boost its discursive power and have its “story” properly told (Jianghao Zhongguo Gushi). On the other hand, however, such attempts to unify the “verbal-ideological world” (Bakhtin 1981: 270) very rarely go unchallenged and a complete ideological closure is never fully possible. The (foreign) journalists, inquisitive by nature, routinely ask sensitive questions, trying to tease out information from the Chinese government. Through posing a range of sensitive, challenging and possibly face-threatening questions (e.g., Taiwan, Tibet and Sino-Japanese relations and democracy), the (foreign) journalists seek to decentralize, potentially countering the “monologising” (Beaton 2007: 29) force of the government. These journalists therefore represent a major centrifugal and destabilizing force which resists the dominant and centripetal force of Beijing.
Interpreters’ location: Negotiation between the centripetal and centrifugal
Having theorized the political press conferences using Bakhtin’s concept of dialogized heteroglossia, it is worth pointing out the interpreters’ specific location in such dynamic exchanges between the journalists and the government. This dynamic Bakhtinian concept has been fruitfully applied by Beaton (2007) and Beaton-Thome (2013) to investigate simultaneous interpreters’ mediation in EU settings. Despite the originality of her introduction of the concept into interpreting studies, Beaton-Thome seems to assume a priori that “interpreter axiology,” that is, interpreter’s individual ideological stance and evaluation in simpler terms, “could be viewed as a potential centrifugal force.” (Beaton 2007:31). Therefore, “the interpreter as an institutional employee and individual subject” is “caught up in this instability between the centripetal force of EU institutional hegemony and the potential centrifugal force of their own axiology” (ibid.). As such, in her study, the interpreter’s institutional and ideological positioning under investigation is examined through placing the interpreter between the centripetal force of the EU and the presumed centrifugal force of his or her own ideological stance (the latter is unknown and is exactly what the researcher sets out to reveal in the first place).
In comparison, China’s interpreter-mediated political press conferences seem to be a more typical case of dialogized heteroglossia, especially given the essentially interactive, dynamic and in situ nature of the event featuring the presence of (foreign) journalists who ask potentially face-threatening and even adversarial questions. Although the interpreters are physically seated alongside the Chinese premier and other high-level officials, they are situationally located at the interface between the Chinese government and the (foreign) journalists pulling in different directions (see Figure 1 for an illustration of the interpreters’ location). 
Figure 1: the interpreters located between the Chinese government and journalists
As such, interpreting in such a political setting is inevitably a highly demanding balancing act. The dynamic, complex, and mediated nature of the discursive event makes it a particularly interesting site to interrogate how the interpreters might negotiate their way in this discursive tug-of-war, that is, how China’s government-affiliated interpreters position and align themselves when placed at the interface between the centralizing and unifying force (their institutional employer) and the decentralizing and disunifying force (foreign journalists) in such a triadic encounter. 
Theoretical framework, data and methodology
With the research questions in mind, critical discourse analysis (CDA) is a highly suitable theoretical framework to empirically examine the interpreters’ negotiation of discursive meaning in this ideological tug-of-war. Viewing discourse as essentially a form of social practice that is both socially shaped and socially shaping (Fairclough and Wodak 1997), CDA aims to uncover and make more explicit the otherwise hidden ideologies and power relations enacted, transmitted and reproduced in discourse. It is generally acknowledged that the predominantly qualitative CDA stands to gain from corpus linguistic approaches as a way of triangulation between the typically qualitative and quantitative in monolingual discourse analysis (cf. Baker et al. 2008; Hardt-Mautner 1995) and more recently in bilingual discourse analysis involving translation (cf. Kim 2017) and interpreting (cf. Gu 2018b; Wang and Feng 2018). However, given the very brief nature of the journalists’ questions covering a wide range of topics (approximately 50–150 words per question) and, more importantly, the fact that the interpreters’ mediation often tends to be subtle and inconspicuous, critical and in-depth manual readings of the text seem best suited for the research aims.
In terms of data, a mini-corpus consisting exclusively of journalists’ questions and their respective interpretations into the other language has been compiled (1998–2017). Containing a total of 77,733 tokens, the corpus features 280 questions asked by domestic and international journalists over 20 years. This corpus is a subset of a large bilingual corpus entitled the Chinese-English Political Discourse Corpus (CE-PolitDisCorp), a corpus developed by the author to investigate the various aspects of China’s (interpreted) political discourse. Transcribed verbatim from videos available on China’s official government websites as well as video-sharing sites like YouTube, the CE-PolitDisCorp contains 20 years of the Premier-Meets-the-Press Conference data (1998–2017) and covers the 3 latest government administrations in mainland China: Jiang-Zhu (1998–2002), Hu-Wen (2003–2012) and Xi-Li (2013–2017) respectively. The data relating specifically to the journalists’ questions covers a wide range of topics and features such domestic and international media outlets as China Daily, CCTV, CNN, Bloomberg, BBC, NBC, Reuters, Le Monde, Sky News, Washington Post and the Associated Press. The wide span of data and the range of (challenging) questions posed make it a particularly rich source to investigate the interpreters’ potential ideological positioning and alignment.
Since CDA is mostly applied in investigating monolingual discourse, in carrying out the critical comparison between the ST and TT, of particular usefulness here is Catford’s (1965: 73) concept of shifts, which he defines as a “departure” from formal correspondence as a result of translation or interpreting. Notably, a wide range of shifts might occur in the process of translation or interpreting, possibly at semantic, lexical, syntactic, stylistic, pragmatic and morphological levels. In operationalizing this concept in the present study, the journalists’ questions in Chinese or English (source text, ST) and their respective interpretations into English or Chinese (target text, TT) are closely and critically compared, with a view to identifying shifts that are interesting and ideologically salient. The comparative and bilingual nature of the data analysis potentially contributes to the “fertile” and growing area of “comparative or multilingual critical discourse analysis” (Al-Hejin 2012: 312). Since the domestic journalists routinely ask easy questions and have similar ideological beliefs as the Chinese government (domestic media outlets such as CCTV and People’s Daily are considered the mouthpieces of Beijing), analytical attention is focused mostly on the foreign journalists’ more critical, challenging, and sensitive questions. Such a focus promises to be more fruitful and salient in comparison in shedding light on the interpreters’ institutional alignment and ideological positioning.

Data analysis
Close critical readings of the corpus data have identified a strong tendency for the press conference interpreters to mediate in the process and position with their institutional employer. Regarding the general findings, the interpreters’ ideological alignment is evidenced most saliently when sensitive and challenging questions are posed by foreign journalists, particularly those that might jeopardize China’s core national interests and call into question the policies and decisions of the CPC government. Such ideological positioning and institutional alignment are achieved through a wide range of linguistic or discursive means and can be broadly categorized as (1) direct and explicit intervention (ideologically salient additions, omissions and replacements, the trivialization/downplaying of sensitive issues, etc.) and (2) indirect and cumulative mediation to soften the confrontational tone of the journalists’ questions (the employment of hedges, ambiguous expressions and honorifics, etc.).
Given the space limitation and the fact that different discursive/linguistic means are often juxtaposed with each other in the interpretation, the linguistic/discursive features are not discussed by category. Instead, critical analysis is presented basing on in-depth and relatively rounded discussions of 5 illustrative examples, with each covering a range of linguistic/discursive strategies adopted by the interpreters. These include ideologically salient additions (example 1), omissions (examples 2 and 3) and replacements (examples 1, 2, 4 and 5), downplaying and backgrounding (examples 3, 4 and 5), trivialization (example 5), employment of hedges (examples 3 and 4), the use of ambiguous and vague language (example 3) and honorifics (examples 3, 4 and 5). Discussions of the five examples can be seen as representative of the overall picture of the interpreters’ ideological positioning and alignment vis-à-vis the government.
The first example is extracted from the 2008 press conference. The CNN journalist’s question touches upon two sensitive topics relating to Tibet and Taiwan, both concerning China’s core national interests. 
Example 1 (2008/CNN) 
ST: I want to ask a question about two issues that begin with the English letter T. One is Tibet. There is turmoil and violence in Tibet and China is accused of cracking down on peaceful demonstrations there. The Dalai Lama calls it a cultural genocide, and in the light of these developments, some are advocating a boycott of the Olympics. What do you, what do you say to these? The other question is Taiwan. You’ve always said that Tai, China will never tolerate the independence of Taiwan. Taiwan this weekend will hold an election and referendum. If the Taiwanese voters approve a proposal in the referendum that Taiwan reapply to the United Nations as Taiwan, will you consider that a de facto declaration of independence, and if so, will China go to war to stop that?...do you think there's a better prospect for you to sit down with the new president in Taiwan?
TT: 我想提出两个问题，这两个问题呢都涉及到英文字母“T”打头的问题。一个就是Tibet，西藏问题。我们知道最近在西藏发生了骚乱和暴力的事件，而有人指责中国镇压了和平的示威游行，而且达赖也指责中国在进行所谓的文化灭绝，甚至呼吁呢要，有一些人也呼吁要抵制北京的奥运会，那么您对这样一些说法和指责有何评论？第二个问题呢是台湾问题。您也多次说过，中国绝不容忍台湾独立，很快台湾地区将举行选举和公决，那么如果公决当中的议案被通过，也就是说如果选民通过选票认为台湾应该以台湾的名义申请加入联合国的话，中方是否会认为这等同于事实上的台独宣言？那么，是否中方会采取行动来制止这一做法?...您认为是否您和未来台湾新的所谓总统进行对话会出现更为光明的前景？
Gloss: I want to ask two questions and both of the two questions involve the English letter T. One is Tibet, Tibet-related question. We know that recently riots and violence happened in Tibet and there are people who accuse China of cracking down on the peaceful demonstrations. And the Dalai Lama is also accusing China of conducting the so-called cultural genocide and even calling on...There are also some people who advocate the boycott of the Beijing Olympics. So what comments do you have for such opinions and accusations? The second question has to do with the Taiwan issue. You’ve said many times that China will never tolerate Taiwan Independence. Very soon, the Taiwan local region will hold an election and referendum. So if the proposal in the referendum is passed, that is to say, that if the voters through their votes think Taiwan should apply to join the United Nations in the name of Taiwan, will the Chinese side consider that this is tantamount to the de facto declaration of Taiwan independence? Then, will the Chinese side take action and stop this move?...Do you think or not that there will be a brighter prospect for dialogue between you and the so-called new future Taiwan president?
In this question, the journalist introduces an alternative and potentially resistant and dissenting voice divergent from China’s official centripetal voice by saying that China’s Tibet policy might constitute a type of ‘cultural genocide’ and the Taiwan leader is ‘president’. Interestingly, ‘cultural genocide’ and ‘the new president in Taiwan’ in the journalist’s question are respectively labeled as ‘so-called cultural genocide’ and ‘so-called new future Taiwan president’ in English. The name-mentioning modifier ‘so-called’ is defined by the Oxford dictionary as a way “to express one’s view that a name or term is inappropriate.” In a similar vein, according to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, ‘so-called’ indicates that something is “falsely or improperly so named.” Such repeated additions of the negative attitudinal epithet (Halliday 1985) “so-called” are highly salient ideologically. This shows the interpreter’s disapproval that the alternative voice expressed by the CNN journalist is false, groundless and illegitimate, thereby signaling the interpreter’s positioning with the Chinese government. Also, worthy of note is the fact that Taiwan as in ‘Taiwan this weekend will hold an election and referendum’ is rendered by the interpreter in an explicit manner as ‘the Taiwan local region’, thus emphasizing that the election and referendum are local or regional in nature at best. Therefore, the interpreter’s such mediation can be viewed as a clear and explicit sign of ideological alignment with the government’s consistent official stance that Taiwan is part of China and the Taiwan election is no more than just “a local election in an area of China,” as evidenced on the website of the Chinese Embassy in the US (2000).
Example 2 (2002/DPA) 
ST: Mr. Prime Minister, this year will be a very crucial year in the selection of the new leadership. And this year also your successor has to be chosen. You have very capable vice-premiers and some delegates also spoke favorable of Mr. Wen Jiabao for example. Can you comment and what will be your personal advice to your successor?
TT: 今年对于中国来讲是非常关键的一年，因为要选举产生新的领导班子包括下一任的总理。您的副总理人选当中有一些是非常能干的。有一些人看好温家宝副总理。您对此能否发表评论？另外对于你的继任者，您有什么样的建议?
Gloss: This year for China is a very critical year because the new leadership including the next premier will be produced through election. Among your vice-premier candidates, some are very competent. Some speak highly of vice-premier Wen Jiabao. Can you comment on this? Also, regarding your successor, what suggestions do you have?
This example extracted from the 2002 press conference is another case in point. In this example, the journalist affiliated with the Deutsche Presse Agentur (DPA) poses questions regarding China’s new leadership. Interestingly, through repeatedly articulating ‘the selection of the new leadership’ and ‘your successor has to be chosen,’ the DPA journalist’s series of questions constitute a major centrifugal force challenging how China’s leaders are produced. That is, these questions can be viewed as thinly veiled accusations, implicitly presupposing that government leaders in mainland China are not democratically elected. Clearly, when placed in the tug-of-war between the Chinese government and foreign journalist, the interpreter chooses to dis-align with the journalist and align instead with the government in the Chinese TT. In other words, the DPA journalist’s repeated wordings ‘selection’ and ‘to be chosen’ are effectively suppressed and omitted in the TT. This is achieved discursively through emphasizing and explicitizing that the new leadership/premier will be ‘produced through election’ 选举产生. As such, the interpreter’s active intervention and (re)formulation of the journalist’s questions lead to a heightened sense that Chinese leaders are not just appointed but elected through proper processes.
Example 3 (2004/Associated Press)
ST: Premier Wen, you’ve promised to make ordinary people your priority. One of the things that has been discussed among them in recent days is Dr. Jiang Yanyong's letter asking the government to declare the 1989 Tian'anmen demonstrations a patriotic movement and to admit that it made a mistake by crushing them. What is the government's response to this and how is China gonna address the people's concerns about this? And also are you gonna declare the 1989 demonstration a patriotic movement?
TT: 那么您呢一直是非常关心中国的普通群众的，前一阵子呢就是有一些人呢写了一封呼吁的信，希望呢把1989年发生的这个事情宣布为是一个爱国的这个行动，那么您觉得这个中国政府方面对于这些人的这个关切应该采取什么立场呢？你会把这个1989年发生的事情宣布为一个爱国的活动吗？
Gloss: So you (nin) have always cared very much about China’s ordinary public. Not long ago (ne) (jiushi) there are some people (ne) who wrote a letter of appeal, hoping (ne) to declare this thing happened in 1989 a patriotic (zhege) movement. So what position do you (nin) think (zhege) Chinese government side should take in response to these people’s (zhege) concern? Will you declare (zhege) thing happened in 1989 a patriotic activity?
This question from the Associated Press journalist in 2004 touches upon the highly sensitive, if not taboo, topic of the quashed 1989 student protests in mainland China. The journalist clearly poses a highly adversarial and face-threatening question regarding whether the government is to declare the incident a patriotic movement and admit that the government made a mistake by crushing the protesters. Interestingly, while this interpreter’s rendition tends to be very fluent throughout that year’s conference, presumably caught off guard by the hard-hitting question, her interpretation of this specific question was particularly hesitant, tentative and in a low voice. As a result, the premier and Chinese official present had to interrupt her approximately 2-3 seconds into her interpretation, requesting her to speak up a little bit (大点声). Such low voice was accompanied by her repeated additions of hedges (Brown and Levinson 1987). The hedges used in this case include 就是 (jiushi, or literally, that is), 这个 (zhege, or literally, this) as well as the Chinese particle 呢 (ne). These, according to Sun (2012), work to significantly reduce the rhetorical force of the original utterance. Also, saliently, the journalist started by quoting you've promised to make ordinary people your priority. Using the premier’s self-claim as the departure point of her question, the journalist implicitly suggested that, if the premier fails to declare the demonstrations a patriotic movement and admit that a mistake was made, the premier risks going back on his promise and being hypocritical. This, interestingly, was rendered in a factual, if not complimentary, manner by the interpreter as you have always cared very much about China’s ordinary public in the interpretation, thus (re)constructing a positive image for the Chinese premier and his government.
Notably, this short stretch of text also features a few instances of ambiguous language use with great ideological salience. Firstly, there are two explicit mentions of the 1989 Tian'anmen demonstration(s) in the journalist’s original question. Interestingly, both instances are effectively backgrounded (cf. Wodak et al. 1999) and rendered by the interpreter in an ambiguous and evasive manner as 1989年发生的(这个)事情 (this thing happened in 1989). Since information relating to the suppressed protests is considered taboo and thus made inaccessible in mainland China, the interpreter’s deliberately ambiguous use of language in Chinese all too likely makes the mainland audience at a loss what is being discussed. Also, the journalist’s seemingly accusatory expression by crushing them, which foregrounds (Fairclough 1992; Gu 2018a; Van Leeuwen 1996) the government as the agent behind the action (crackdown), is completely omitted in the Chinese interpretation. Similarly, the person requesting the government to declare the incident a patriotic movement is also deliberately made ambiguous in Chinese using 有一些人 (there are some people) and 这些人 (these people) without mentioning explicitly who wrote the letter and how. Such backgrounding, ideologically salient omission and ambiguous language use are in line with the government’s consistent treatment of the incident, that is, to downplay or cover up the event. Last but not least, the honorific marker 您nin (polite form of the second-person pronoun you) is consistently used by the interpreter to show deference in Chinese. As such, the otherwise highly accusatory and adversarial tone of the face-threatening question is significantly softened through interpreter’s combined use of these linguistic/discursive devices, thus indicating a strong level of interpreter’s ideological alignment with the government when located at the interface between the centripetal force (government) and centrifugal force (foreign journalists).
Example 4 is taken from the premier’s press conference in 2016, focusing on the important yet strained bilateral ties between China and the US. This example illustrates a range of discursive strategies where the illocutionary force of the journalist’s question is significantly softened when interpreted into Chinese, thus saving the face of the Chinese premier.
Example 4 (2016/NBC) 
ST: Respected Premier Li, your work report has outlined steps to stabilize China’s economic growth, which should help the global economy. But there is one factor of uncertainty and that is the continuing dispute between the world’s two largest economies over a range of disputes. So with due respect Mr. Premier, what do you propose can be done to improve China-US relations and address American concerns with respect to market access, investment restrictions, level the playing field...competition to American companies, or fair trading practice that do not steal American jobs: issues that have been raised by some candidates in the current US election campaign? 
TT: 总理先生，在您的政府工作报告当中呢, 您提出一系列稳定中国经济增长的措施，这些也都会有助于世界经济的发展，但同时还存在一个不确定因素，就是似乎在中美这两个世界上最大的经济体之间，在某些问题上，还是始终存在一些分歧。那么总理先生，您觉得应该采取什么措施来改善中美关系，以及中方如何回应美方在有关问题上存在的一系列关切，包括市场准入，投资限制，对美国企业的公平待遇，以及...啊...公平贸易以便不要蚕食美国的国内就业岗位还有其它美国总统大选过程中的一些候选人提出的关切。
Gloss: Mr. Premier, in your (nin polite you) government work report ne, you (nin polite you) put forward a series of measures to stabilize China’s economy. These all will contribute to the development of world economy. But at the same time there still exists one uncertain factor. That is, it seems that between China and the US, two biggest economies in the world, on certain problems, there still are some differences. So Mr. Premier, what measures do you (nin polite you) think will improve the China-US relations and how does China respond to certain concerns the US has including market access, investment restrictions, fair treatment to US companies, and..ah..fair trade so as not to canshi American domestic jobs and other concerns raised by some candidates in the current US election campaign.
Although the NBC journalist started his question with ‘respected Premier Li’, the question he raised is challenging and potentially face-threatening in nature overall. Signaled by ‘with due respect’, the journalist explicitly asked what can be done as American jobs are being stolen, for example, due to unfair trade practices from China. Signs of the interpreter’s ideological and institutional positioning are manifest in a number of ways. First and foremost, the NBC journalist said that ‘there is one factor of uncertainty and that is the continuing dispute between the world’s two largest economies over a range of disputes’. Notably, however, when rendered into Chinese, the hedge seem is added on the part of the interpreter that it seems that the two biggest economies have some differences. While the journalist explicitly mentions that there exists ‘a range of disputes’ between China and the US, this is downplayed by the interpreter using the ambiguous expression that there are disputes on某些问题 mouxie wenti (certain problems).
Notably, the potential accusation that unfair trade practices from China, among other things, steal American jobs is also considerably softened through using the more formal and neutral word 蚕食 (canshi). Rendering the word steal using canshi (to erode or eat away) is ideologically salient, implying a gradual step-by-step process of jobs getting lost or being eaten away. As such, the accusatory, value-laden and highly emotionally charged word steal repeatedly lexicalized (cf. Beaton-Thome 2013) by US politicians is effectively replaced and re-lexicalized using lexical item with less negative connotations. In addition, the Chinese particles ne and ah are also added on the part of the interpreter in the Chinese TT. Pragmatically, such additions tend to serve as hedging devices (cf. Hyland 1998), which help convey a hesitant and tentative attitude. As such, the severity of the pressing problems (which undermine the bilateral relationship) is significantly downplayed when rendered into Chinese.
The downplaying of the face-threatening elements is accompanied by the interpreter’s (re)construction of a positive image for the Chinese government. Notably, a modality shift has occurred in interpreting the journalist’s question. That is, the journalist’s tentative estimation that steps taken by the Chinese government should help the global economy is interpreted in a more factual manner as the measures 都会有助于世界经济的发展 (all will contribute to the development of world economy). The journalist’s educated guess or speculative evaluation is, in so doing, rendered into Chinese in more absolute terms, that is, the measures taken by Beijing will surely be highly effective in helping the global economy. Discursively, this conveys a strong sense of certainty, thus indirectly (re)constructing a positive image of the government being effective, resourceful and competent. Lastly, the non-specific second-person pronoun you and its related form your in English (2 instances in total) are intertextually rendered into the Chinese TT using the polite and deferential honorific nin (3 instances in total with 1 addition untriggered by the ST content or syntactic differences between the two languages). This therefore contributes to an added degree of deference through interpreting. As such, the interpreter’s ideological positioning manifests itself in the combined use of these strategies, which helps to cushion the blow discursively and (re)construct a more positive image of the self, that is, the Chinese government. This constitutes a typical case of “ideological square” as elaborated by Van Dijk (1997), which entails the positive/less negative portrayal of the self in discursive communication. Cognitively, this can be seen as an indicator of a member’s positioning and group identity.
Another interesting example of the interpreter’s ideological positioning and institutional alignment can be found in example 5, where certain sensitive elements in the Reuters journalist’s question are effectively downplayed and even trivialized (cf. Wodak et al. 1999) by the interpreter.

Example 5 (2008/Reuters) 
ST: Today, a young man named Hu Jia goes on trial in Beijing, charged with inciting subversion of state power. I feel confident you have heard of his case because I know that the visiting leaders including Condoleezza Rice, have, have raised it with China's leaders. I'd like to ask in relation to this case. How China can defend itself against critics who say that the arrest of Hu Jia is part of crackdown ahead of the Olympics.
TT: 我们今天知道有一个叫胡佳的人正在北京接受审判，他的罪名呢是颠覆国家政权。我想您应该清楚这个案子，因为呢美国包括赖斯等都向中方的领导人提过这个个案。我在此想请教的是，现在国际上有舆论批评中方呢, 在奥运会召开之前呢，进一步加大对一些持批评意见人的这种逮捕的力度。那我想问下您有何评论?
Gloss: We today learned that there is a person named Hu Jia who is now on trial in Beijing. His charge is inciting subversion of state power. I think you should be clear about this case because the US including Rice has mentioned this isolated case to the leaders on the Chinese side. I hereby would like to seek your expertise, now internationally there are media outlets who criticize that China in the run-up to the Olympic Games has further intensified its effort to arrest people with dissenting views. Then, I would like to ask about your comments.
In this example extracted from the 2008 conference, the Reuters journalist grills the Chinese premier on the trial of a person charged with inciting subversion of state power (hence a centrifugal force). The severity of this high-profile and sensitive case is significantly lessened by the interpreter in various ways. When rendered into Chinese, the interpreter explicitly trivialized (cf. Wodak et al. 1999 for the discursive strategy of trivialization) the case as a 个案 (an isolated or individual case), which presumably does not represent the whole picture at all and is thus not worthy of widespread media attention/coverage. Interestingly, such ideologically salient replacement was subsequently picked up by the Chinese premier as a starting point of his answer almost strategically that China is under the rule of law and all issues including this isolated case will be properly dealt with in accordance with law. Also, the journalist’s more direct and straightforward, if not blunt, wording I'd like to ask in relation to this case is significantly softened in the interpretation as 我在此想请教 (I hereby would like to seek your expertise). 请教 (qingjiao) in Chinese is a particularly polite and humble way of seeking expertise from someone who is senior or knowledgeable. This therefore has an impact on the existing power relationship, (re)constructing an image of the otherwise confrontational journalist being in a junior position and keen to humbly ask questions. Notably, the honorific marker nin is again consistently used by the interpreter in the TT. These, however nuanced, subtle and perhaps individually insignificant, in effect have further mitigated the severity of the issue and softened the strong confrontational tone of the original question. Cumulatively, such linguistic and discursive engineering serves to mitigate the negative other representation of the self, which forms part of van Dijk’s ideological square (1997). Taken together, these again point to the interpreter’s ideological positioning and institutional identification with Beijing.
Discussions and conclusion
Benefiting from a corpus consisting of 20 years’ press conference data and drawing on Bakhtin’s concept of dialogized heteroglossia, comparative bilingual CDA has been applied to the investigation of the interpreters’ level of ideological positioning and institutional alignment. Critical examination of ideologically significant shifts between the STs and TTs shows that, when located at the discursive tug-of-war between the government and (foreign) journalists who are from different, if not opposing, ideological standpoints, the interpreters tend to resist the centrifugal force of the latter, choosing to position themselves institutionally and gravitate toward the Chinese government and its official ideological stances (centripetal force) instead. Unsurprisingly, their positioning and discursive mediation are most pronounced when rendering foreign journalists’ challenging and potentially face-threatening questions (centrifugal force) that touch upon sensitive/taboo topics and China’s core national interests (e.g. Tibet and Taiwan). The interpreters’ agency and ideological mediation are mainly manifest in two broad scenarios. As the illustrative examples have shown, when the journalists’ sensitive questions potentially harm China’s core interests and challenge China’s desired version of its story, the interpreters would step in, intervene in the process and gravitate toward the centripetal force of the government’s official positions, thus constituting a more explicit and noticeable sort of mediation. In other cases, the interpreters would cushion the blow of the journalists’ adversarial questions and downplay the severity of issues covered in a cumulative and less noticeable manner to protect the face and image of the Chinese premier and government.
Also, dialogized heteroglossia has proven particularly powerful in conceptualizing and making sense of the multivoiced and thus necessarily negotiated nature of the interpreter-mediated press conferences. From this perspective, rather than just translating faithfully like invisible agents, the interpreters in such a highly dynamic and volatile political and institutional setting seem to have assumed a role as institutional gatekeepers who control the flow of information and, meanwhile, as official spokespersons of China’s English discourse and, if necessary, staunch active defenders of China’s national interests. This level of agency doubtlessly is beyond the traditional de-contextualized and perhaps idealized prescriptivist meta-discursive representations (cf. Diriker 2004; Gu 2018a) of interpreters as mere voice machines and conduits devoid of agency as seen in prevalent codes of conducts (AIIC and NAATI etc.) underscoring impartiality and accuracy. This is unsurprising considering that quite a few government translators and interpreters affiliated with the foreign ministry’s Department of Translation and Interpretation have gone on to take prominent positions as key diplomats and government officials later in their careers within China’s political hierarchy. For example, the interpreter-turned politician Mrs. Fu Ying was formerly ambassador to the United Kingdom and currently China’s vice foreign minister. Likewise, Mr. Yang Jiechi from a similar background was formerly China’s foreign minister and now a state councilor. Future avenues of research might be to investigate the interpreters’ alignment from a diachronic perspective and see if there might be any individual differences among these interpreters in order to gain a more nuanced picture of their agency. 
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^1	  Taking a dynamic and dialogic view of language, Bakhtin (1981) often sees communication as polyphonic in nature and containing different voices. Notably, there are different readings of Bakhtin’s thinking in various disciplines and contexts (e.g. language learning and literature). As such, the introduction of the Bakhtinian concept here only constitutes a specific reading and application of Bakhtin’s concept in China’s political and institutional setting relating to translation and interpreting.
